McLay, Keith A. J.2012-05-232012-05-232007-11-01War in History, 2007, 14(4), pp. 383-4070968-344510.1177/0968344507081554http://hdl.handle.net/10034/225514This article is not available through ChesterRep.This article uses the evidence of an amphibious campaign undertaken first in the Caribbean and then off the north-eastern American seaboard during the Nine Years War, 1688—97 to rejuvenate an understanding of combined operational command, which harks back to the views of the principal eighteenth-century author on amphibious warfare, Thomas More Molyneaux. In this analysis, combined operational command is shown to be a negotiated operational construct between the service commanders and the government, as a result of which disagreements related to the command structure and the subsequent dilution of authority through an executive council of war significantly impacted upon operational success.enArchived with thanks to War in Historyamphibious operationsSir Francis WhelerArticleWar in History