The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness

Abstract: According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co‐presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential‐presence in terms of a form of non‐intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non‐intentional experiential‐presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non‐intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non‐intentional experiential presence.

Citation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10034/624922

Type

article

Description

From Wiley via Jisc Publications Router
History: received 2020-11-14, rev-recd 2021-02-11, accepted 2021-05-05, pub-electronic 2021-06-11
Article version: VoR
Publication status: Published